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SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE MILITARY: TIME FOR A
CHANGE OF FORUM?
MICHAEL I. SPAK1 AND JONATHAN P. TOMES2
Laws are regulations and institutions. Those who excel in war first
cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and
institution. Sun Tzu, The Art of War
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I. INTRODUCTION
Little doubt exists that despite “zero tolerance” policies, increased sensitivity
training, and other measures designed to eliminate or at least minimize sexual
harassment in the military, female service members are still subjected to pervasive
sexual harassment. Although both co-authors have proposed the abolition of the
military courts-martial system in time of peace3 and one has proposed the repeal of
the so-called Feres doctrine which prohibits servicemembers from suing their
military commanders for monetary damages,4 perhaps stronger reasons exist to
replace courts-martial with civil rights lawsuits for sexual harassment offenses
committed by servicemembers. This article will review the current status of sexual
harassment in the military, discuss why courts-martial are ineffective in punishing
and deterring sexual harassment, and suggest that permitting sexual harassment
claims in a forum other than the military justice system would help deter future
sexual harassment in the military at no greater cost to military discipline and
preparedness than is inherent in the current system.
1
Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, B.S. 1958; J.D. 1961, De Paul
University; L.L.M. 1962, Northwestern University. Professor Spak is a retired reserve colonel
in the Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps and author of CASES AND MATERIALS ON
MILITARY LAW.
2
Partner, Tomes & Dvorak, Leawood, Kansas; B.S. 1968, University of Cincinnati; J.D.
1975, Oklahoma City University. Mr. Tomes is a retired lieutenant colonel in the Army Judge
Advocate General’s Corps and author of THE SERVICEMEMBER’S LEGAL GUIDE (3d ed).
3
Michael Spak & Jonathan Tomes, Courts-Martial: Time to Play Taps? 28 S.W. U. L.REV.
481 (2000).
4
See Jonathan P. Tomes, Feres to Chappell to Stanley: Three Strikes and Servicemembers
are Out, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 93 (1990).
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II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT—A CONTINUING PROBLEM FOR TODAY’S MILITARY
Despite increased training in the prevention of sexual harassment,5 “zero
tolerance” policies,6 and highly publicized courts-martial of those accused of sexual
harassment,7 sexual harassment continues to be a problem for the United States
military. For example, Naval investigators reported 156 cases of inappropriate
relationships between January 1996 and May 1998 at Great Lakes Naval Base, where
the Navy conducts its basic training. Among these cases were 14 cases of sexual
harassment of recruits by instructors.8 Not only do investigations and disciplinary

5
See STATEMENT AND STATUS REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON MILITARY
TRAINING, “GENDER - RELATED ISSUES IN MILITARY TRAINING,” 1999 WL 8086648 (March 17,
1999), which notes, for example, that the Army now includes prevention of sexual harassment
as a part of basic combat training, and equal opportunity and sexual harassment training as
part of the Pre-Command Course, Cadre Training Course and others.
6

An article in the Naval Law Review defined a “zero tolerance” sexual harassment policy
as one that “means that every individual complaint of sexual harassment will be investigated
and that the individuals involved in the ‘unwanted’ sexual attention will be brought to justice.”
Kristin K. Heimark, Sexual Harassment in the United States Navy: A New Pair of Glasses, 44
NAVAL L. REV. 223, n. 9 (1997). The Navy announced its “zero tolerance” policy in 1989
when Navy Secretary Lawrence Garret issued the following instruction:
Sexual harassment is unacceptable conduct; it undermines the integrity of the
employment relationship, debilitates morale, and interferes with the work productivity
of an organization. Sexual harassment will not be tolerated at any level. Substantiated
acts of or conduct which results in sexual harassment shall result in corrective action.
Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary, SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5300.26A
(1989).
Criticism of the “zero tolerance” policy focuses on the belief that the military professes zero
tolerance easily but fails to enforce it:
The military professes to have “zero tolerance” of sexual harassment, with elaborate
policies to define and prevent offenses. Unfortunately, the phrase “zero tolerance” has
become a parody of itself, more accurately referring to things the military doesn’t
really care to do anything about. Instead of taking action to enforce a policy and
eliminate problem behavior, which the military is historically quite effective in doing,
it is much easier to just proclaim there is “zero tolerance” and move on to something
else.
Diane H. Mazur, The Beginning of the End for Women in the Military, 48 U. FLA. L. REV. 461,
464 (1996).
7

Perhaps the most notorious trial was that of the Sergeant Major of the Army, Gene
McKinney, for sexual harassment, allegedly consisting of pressuring subordinates for dates,
forced kissing, and boasting of his sexual prowess to female subordinates. Sergeant Major
McKinney was acquitted by general court-martial of all sexual harassment charges and
convicted of one specification of obstruction of justice for attempting to coach the testimony
of one of his accusers. See e.g., Stephen Komarow, Army Sex Scandal Reaches Higher,
Service’s Top Enlisted Man Faces Charges, USA TODAY, May 8, 1997, at 3A; Jane Gross,
Former Top Sergeant of Army is Acquitted of All Sex Charges, NY TIMES, Mar. 14, 1998, at
A1; Jane Gross, When Character Counts, NY TIMES, Mar. 15, 1998, at A1. Certainly some
irony exists in being convicted of trying to cover up crimes one was found not guilty of.
8

Navy Report: Sexual Harassment Not Pervasive at Coed Boot Camp, THE STATE
JOURNAL-REGISTER, Dec. 26, 1998, (Local) at 12. If 156 cases is not pervasive, what is?

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss3/5

2

1999]

SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE MILITARY

337

actions9 indicate that harassment continues, but also so do formal reports and
scholarly writings.10 This continued problem with sexual harassment not only harms
the victims, but also harms the morale, discipline, and effectiveness of our fighting
forces. Some see these adverse effects as a part of the legacy of the Clinton
administration’s efforts to make the military reflect the wider American society as
shown by mandating the Navy to assign women to all combat ships.11 One woman
commentator noted:
Bill Clinton’s tenure in office has been quite damaging to the military.
Readiness has suffered terribly. Morale is very low. And attrition is
leaving the Air Force with a shortage of pilots and the Navy with a
shortage of officers.
Because the Clinton administration has been determined to advance
the cause of women in combat, the military has been plagued by sexual
harassment, rape, pregnancy and low morale. . . .12
This commentator is not alone in her concern. Regardless of whether the
problems the military is experiencing are attributable to the Clinton administration;
to an inherent “warrior mentality” in the male-dominated military;13 or to poorly
9
E.g., Amanda Vogt, Ex-Navy Instructor Admits to Sex Charges, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct.
7, 1998, (Metro Lake) at 1 (Navy Petty Officer sentenced to a demotion, a bad-conduct
discharge, and 198 days confinement for pleading guilty to sexual harassment and
fraternization with recruits); Sailor in Sex Case Still Unhappy, AP ONLINE 1998 WL 21782521
(Nov. 3, 1998) (reporting the victim of sexual harassment’s dissatisfaction with nonjudicial
punishment taken against the commander of a Navy destroyer who made suggestive comments
and kissed her. The maximum punishment he could receive (the actual punishment was not
reported) was 30 days restriction and a punitive letter of reprimand). 10 U.S.C. § 815 art. 15
(1999) (hereinafter U.C.M.J.) permits commanders to impose various punishments, depending
on the rank of the commander and the servicemember being punished without a trial by courtmartial.
10

See e.g., William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the
Congress App. G, Table G-2 (1998) (detailing the high number of sexual harassment
complaints filed with the Department of Defense between 1987 and 1996); MARGARET C.
HARRELL & LAURA L. MILLER, NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR MILITARY WOMEN: EFFECTS UPON
READINESS, COHESION, AND MORALE 73-77 (1997).
11
Paul Craig Roberts, The ‘Can-do’ Curse . . . and Fade-out, THE WASHINGTON TIMES
(Mar. 18, 1999) at A18.
12
Mona Charen, Editorial: What is Sapping the Spirit of America’s Military, THE
AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, (Oct. 26, 1998) at A04.
13

See LINDA BIRD FRANCKE, GROUND ZERO: THE GENDER WARS IN THE MILITARY 152
(1997).
This author describes the warrior culture as one that demands women’s
marginalization because accepting women as peers would by antithetical to the macho identity
encouraged by the military. Id. at 157. Professional soldiers, however, maintain that the
warrior culture is necessary to develop combat soldiers. One marine infantryman stated, “You
can call [the warrior culture] BS but until someone comes up with a better way to get terrified
18-year-olds to stand up in front of machine guns . . . I’m sticking with it.” Thomas E. Ricks,
U.S. Army Fights to Recruit Amid Less- Macho Image, WALL STREET J. EUR., (Jul. 17, 1997),
at 4 (quoting John Lundy).
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thought-out policies to combat sexual harassment,14 sexual harassment and the
methods used to remedy it continue to cause problems for commanders and those
they lead. For example, the Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services
(DACOWITS) reported that male supervisors feared their superiors would not
support them if they tried to hold women accountable, and subordinate females
feared that this situation harmed their opportunity to be treated as equals.15
The solutions to these problems may actually exacerbate the problems women
face in the military. Professor Diane H. Mazur, a former Air Force officer, in an
article which demonstrates a great insight into the military, has noted that potential
solutions, although advanced by those who support greater military participation by
women, “are more dangerous because they are superficially protective and
supportive, yet unwittingly they will erode the already uncertain status of military
women even further.”16 She believes that the solutions are based on an incorrect
assumption—that women are incapable of resisting inappropriate sexual behavior or,
in many cases, of reporting it:
The military has already taken a number of steps to prevent future
instances of sexual misconduct against women recruits and, at least so far,
the military’s actions have been applauded. In particular, the Army has
increased supervision of recruits, has moved to severely punish past
offenders, and is devising new systems for reporting misconduct.
Unfortunately, these actions have been myopically short-term in nature.
Each carries a long-term danger for women in the military, and in the
hurry “to do something,” little attention has been paid to whether they are
doing more harm than good.17
As examples of “fixes” that are contraproductive, Professor Mazur cites training
regulations which prohibit trainees from going anywhere alone. She believes that
such a policy, that women must be protected from harm by restricting their liberty, is
similar to the rationale behind prohibiting women in combat, that no one on the
battlefield can protect women from attacks by their fellow soldiers.18 Further, , in
her view, prosecutors often only discipline the men, where both men and women
14

See, e.g., Tom Bowman, Army Officers Fear Dating Ban May Hurt Bonds Within Units:
Cohen Expected to OK Policy Soon; He Wants Same Code Among All Branches, THE DALLAS
MORNING NEWS (Jan. 3, 1999) at 9A (ban on socializing between junior officers and their
sergeants would harm camaraderie and unit cohesion). A very-well thought out article
postulates that “more so than in other areas of the law, the legal regulation of sexual conduct
has been characterized by inattention and panic, minimization and overreaction.” Martha
Chamallas, The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex Scandals and the Military, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 305, 306 (1998) (the military is a dramatic illustration of the inattention/panic
contradiction leading to the conclusion that curing the problem of sexual harassment by the
resegregation of women in basic training stems from faulty logic that confuses sexual
harassment with heterosexuality, and mistakes power for sexual desire).
15

Rowan Scarborough, Pentagon Finds Less Harassment; Officers Cite ‘Fear’ of Women,
THE WASHINGTON TIMES (Dec. 10, 1998) at A1.
16

Mazur, supra note 6, at 42.

17

Id. at 465.

18

Id. at 466.
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have engaged in inappropriate but consensual relationships. The problem with this is
that exempting women from responsibility diminishes their service and sets a poor
precedent for the future.19 Finally, new systems for reporting misconduct are
unlikely to be productive because they do not use the chain of command. Using the
chain of command is ingrained in all servicemembers, but once one goes outside it to
report a problem, that problem is no longer a priority for the command:
Policies that encourage women to take their complaints outside the chain
of command are the worst possible way to approach the problem of sexual
misconduct. If we tell the military that it is incapable of preventing sexual
misconduct, it will never become capable. If we tell individual
supervisors and commanders that they are incompetent to respond to
women’s concerns, they will remain incompetent.20
In short, sexual harassment continues to be a major problem for the military.
Further, the existing system for dealing with sexual harassment does not appear to be
adequate to deal with the problem. Rather, both the existing system and recent
“fixes” appear to be exacerbating the problem—harming both the military and those
the system is designed to protect. While scholars have proposed a number of
solutions,21 this article will focus on the forum for adjudicating harassment cases—
the court-martial—and suggest another forum—the civil lawsuit for sexual
harassment—would better reduce the problem and protect potential victims of such
harassment.
III. COURTS-MARTIAL FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT—THE WRONG SYSTEM AND THE
WRONG FACTFINDER
The military justice system, including courts-martial, was hardly designed to
determine whether a female servicemember was the victim of sexual harassment by
another servicemember.22 Nor are the factfinders in this system particularly suited

19
Id. at 467-69. The author does not suggest that men should not be punished as severely
as has occurred, nor that women should be punished as severely. The punishment should be
related to the degree of culpability which will normally result in a higher-ranking male being
punished more severely than a lower-ranking female. Id. at 467.
20

Id. at 470.

21

Chamallas, supra note 14, at 361-63 (rename and reorient the offense of fraternization
because in its current “sexualized meaning,” the rules are incoherent and place too much
emphasis on the dangers of sexual conduct as opposed to overly-familiar behavior, and reduce
or eliminate broad bans on consensual conduct outside the chain of command); Yxta Maya
Murray, Sexual Harassment in the Military, 3 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 279, 290-91
(1994) (extend Title VII to uniformed personnel).
22
Besides the lack of women in the military at the time our military justice system was
created, little doubt exists that it was viewed as an instrument of discipline, not a system of
justice. See O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (off-post offenses must be
“service-connected” for courts-martial jurisdiction) (“A court-martial is not yet an independent
instrument of justice but remains to a significant degree a specialized part of the overall
mechanism by which military discipline is preserved.”) overruled by Solorio v. United States,
483 U.S. 435 (1987) (active duty status at the time of the offense is sufficient for jurisdiction);
JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW 21-24 (1974).
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for making this type of determination, whether the factfinder is a commander who is
deciding whether the allegation is substantiated so as to require disciplinary action
against the offender, whether the factfinder is a convening authority deciding
whether to try a case by court-martial, or whether the factfinder is a court-martial
panel trying to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether to convict an accused
harasser.
The problems with the military justice system itself are exacerbated by sexual
harassment cases. The first problem is that commanders, not lawyers, decide what, if
any disciplinary action to take. While under Rules for Court-Martial (hereinafter
R.C.M.) 301, any person may report an offense subject to trial by court-martial, any
military authority who receives such a report must forward it to the suspect’s
immediate commander. Upon receiving such a report, the commander should make
a preliminary inquiry into the allegations.23 Under R.C.M. 306, each commander has
the discretion to dispose of offenses by members of his or her command. A
commander may take any of the following actions:
• No action.24
• Administrative action, such as an administrative separation.25
• Nonjudicial punishment.26
• Trial by court-martial.27
If the commander believes that the offense is too serious to dispose of at his or
her level, the commander may forward the matter to a superior authority for
disposition.28 Lower-level commanders may not convene courts-martial,29 for
23

RULES FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (hereinafter R.C.M) 303.

24

R.C.M. 306(c)(1).

25
The MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL (hereinafter M.C.M.) lists the following possible
administrative actions a commander may take in response to a reported offense: counseling,
admonition, reprimand, exhortation, disapproval, criticism, censure, reproach, rebuke, extra
military instruction, or the administrative withholding of privileges in R.C.M. 306(c)(2).
Other administrative measures include adverse efficiency or academic reports, reassignment,
career field reclassification, reduction in grade, bar to reenlistment, security clearance
revocation, pecuniary liability for negligence or misconduct (as if the offense damaged
military property), and administrative separation. Id., Discussion.
26
R.C.M. 306(c)(3). See note 9, supra, for a short summary of a commander’s powers to
impose nonjudicial punishment under Article 15, U.C.M.J.
27

R.C.M. 306(c)(4).

28

R.C.M. 306(c)(5).

29
10 U.S.C. §§ 822-824, specify who may convene general, special, and summary courtsmartial. A general court-martial may adjudge any penalty specified for the offense under the
punitive articles of 10 U.S.C. §§ 880-934, including the death penalty, confinement for life,
dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, and total
forfeitures of pay and allowances. 10 U.S.C. § 818. A special court may adjudge a badconduct discharge, confinement for not more than six months, reduction to the lowest enlisted
grade, and forfeiture of two-thirds pay per month for six months. 10 U.S.C. § 819. A
summary court may only adjudge confinement for not more than one month, and forfeiture of
two-thirds of one month’s pay. 10 U.S.C. § 820. All these courts-martial can adjudge other
penalties, such as reprimands, restriction to specified limits, and the like. Under Article 22,
above, a typical Army general-martial convening authority, for example, is a general officer
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example, and the nonjudicial punishments they may impose are less severe than
those which higher commanders may impose. In making these decisions,
commanders often get advice from judge advocates as to how to dispose of offenses,
but do not have to do so except if referring30 a case to a court-martial. And even in
those cases, they do not have to follow the advice. In both authors’ experience as
judge advocates, it was not uncommon for a commander to not follow legal advice as
to whether to try a particular offense by court-martial or not. Sometimes
commanders ordered a trial when the lawyer advised otherwise and sometimes they
refused to order a trial when the lawyer urged that the offense was so serious that no
other means of disposition was appropriate. If the lawyer disagrees, his or her only
recourse is to ask a superior commander to take away the subordinate’s authority to
act and persuade the senior to order trial by court-martial, an act that hardly endears
the lawyer to the subordinate commander, who may be sitting on the lawyer’s next
promotion board.31
While a commander’s ability to prosecute a case or not prosecute a case against
the advice of military lawyers may either subject an innocent servicemember to trial,
subject a guilty servicemember to a far more severe sanction imposed by a courtmartial than is warranted, or permit a guilty servicemember to avoid criminal
liability in any type of case, the potential for making a bad decision as to how to
dispose of a sexual harassment case is even greater for the following reasons:
• Evaluation of a sexual harassment case is far more complicated than
deciding whether a servicemember should be punished for absence without
leave.32 Professor Chamallas, in her article on the military’s “gender panic,”
opines that this panic lumps both coercive and consensual sexual conduct
into the same undifferentiated source, biological urges, which results in
commanders treating rapists as if they caused the same type of injuries to
persons who have committed adultery.33 Further, because most commanders
are male, and the senior ones are usually older males, they may have
difficulty divorcing themselves from a culture that has historically viewed
sexual harassment as unimportant.34
commanding an Army division, separate brigade, or major installation. A typical Army
special court-martial convening authority is a brigade, separate battalion, or small installation
commander under Article 23. A typical Army summary court-martial convening authority is a
battalion or separate company commander under Article 24. See generally Stephen A. Lamb,
The Court-Martial Panel Selection Process: A Critical Analysis, 137 MIL. L. REV. 103, 125
(1992).
30
“Referral” is “the order of a convening authority that charges against an accused will be
tried by a specified court-martial.” R.C.M. 601(a).
31

R.C.M. 306(a) notes that a superior commander may withhold the authority to dispose of
offenses in individual cases, types of cases, or generally.
32

10 U.S.C. § 886 (2000) criminalizes leaving one’s military unit without authority.

33

Chamallas, supra note 14, at 320.

34

Douglas R. Kay, Comment, Running a Gauntlet of Sexual Abuse: Sexual Harassment of
Female Naval Personnel in the United States Navy, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 307, 330 (1992)
(citing Kay Krohne, The Effect of Sexual Harassment on Female Naval Officers: A
Phenomenological Study at 178) (unpublished Ed. D. dissertation, University of San Diego)
(on file with author). For a discussion of the effects of the military’s culture on sexual
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Political correctness pressures, media pressures, and the like may lead to bad
decisions. Such pressures can cause the commander to either prosecute a
servicemember he or she shouldn’t or, strangely enough, prevent
prosecutions that should occur. Professor Chamallas has noted the
phenomenon that the excessive media coverage of the numerous military sex
cases creates the impression that things have gone too far and it is time to
stop the accusations.35 In addition, media saturation has generated a high
degree of skepticism about the legitimacy of complaints of sexual
harassment.36 Finally, commanders, out of fear of the post-Tailhook
bloodletting (which destroyed careers or delayed promotions) may tend to
err “on the side of inquisition, persecution, and recrimination.”37
• Further, commanders have a strong incentive not to find a sexual harassment
claim to be valid. Finding that one of his or her subordinates sexually
harassed another may well indicate to the commander’s superiors that he or
she does not have an effective program to combat sexual harassment.
Further, if the media gets involved, it makes not only the immediate unit, but
higher units, and the military service itself look bad. Such problems are
hardly career-enhancing:
At each level of the chain, the superior officer has discretion concerning how to
deal with the complaint. Additionally, each superior has a vested interest in what is
termed in naval aviation parlance “covering your six.” Each individual is held
responsible for the personnel below them. Covering your six can lead to many
complaints being hidden or ignored. Investigations into a complaint attract attention
to the problem, and a problem looks bad for the superior responsible.38
Assuming that the commander makes a proper decision to send a sexual
harassment case to a court-martial,39 the issue remains whether a court-martial is a
•

harassment and other sex crimes, see FRANCKE, supra note 13, at 152, 190; Murray, supra
note 21, at 296-97; Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the
Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV. 499, 525 (1991).
35

Chamallas, supra, note 14, at 320.

36

Id. at 321.

37

Bruce T. Smith, Tempting the Better Part of Valor, 44-FEB FED. LAW. 13, 13 (Feb.
1977).
38

Krohne, supra, note 34, at 331 (citing DOROTHY SCHNEIDER & CARL SCHNEIDER, SOUND
OFF? AMERICAN MILITARY WOMEN SPEAK OUT 47 (1988) (“Usually the physical assaults
servicewomen told us about were reported but handled semiofficially, at as low a level as
possible, by people who wished to quiet the troubled waters or swim out of them.”). Id.
39

The MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL provides the following guidance to commanders as
to how to dispose of offenses:
(b) Policy. Allegations of offenses should be disposed of in a timely manner and the
lowest appropriate level of disposition listed in subsection (c) of this rule: (see supra
notes 20-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dispositions authorized by
R.C.M. 306(c)).

Discussion
The disposition decision is one of the most important and difficult decisions facing a
commander. Many factors must be taken into consideration and balanced, including,
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proper forum for a sexual harassment case. Among the many problems with the
court-martial system in general are: courts-martial are not sitting courts, but rather
are “convened” by commanders; commanders select the court-members (jurors);
commanders decide, subject to review by the military judge, on many pretrial
motions, such as discovery motions and motions to produce witnesses; commanders
enter into plea bargains with defendants or immunize witnesses to induce them to
testify, and so-called “command influence” can taint the trial. These problems may
make arriving at a proper decision unlikely in a court-martial. In addition, other
aspects of the military justice system, which may not lead to unfair decisions in other
cases, such as the requirement to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and the nonunanimous jury verdict requirement in a court-martial, may prevent reaching a
proper decision in a sexual harassment case.
Courts-martial are not sitting courts, but rather comprise ad hoc tribunals to
which commanders may refer one or more cases for trial.40 The same problems with
commanders investigating and disposing of sexual harassment complaints apply to
convening authorities’41 decisions whether to send a sexual harassment case to trial
by court-martial. First, as one military court-martial illustrated, the convening
authority may not be the one who should make decisions as to whether a sexual
harassment claim goes to trial. In United States v. Kroop,42 the convening authority
in a sexual harassment case was being investigated for sexual crimes of a similar
nature to those of the accused. The military appellate court did not find these facts
relevant to disqualify the convening authority.43 Would a civilian criminal justice
system allow a prosecutor under investigation for a crime make decisions about
defendants charged with similar crimes? In addition, the higher ranking commander
who convenes courts-martial and refers cases to them, may have difficulty evaluating
a sexual harassment case, may be pressured by the media or others, or may want to
cover-up a harassment case to avoid looking as if such problems exist in his or her
command, rather than referring the case to trial.44
The difficulty with evaluating a case at the convening authority level, as opposed
to a lower level, is that the convening authority who believes the offense is serious

to the extent practicable, the nature of the offenses, any mitigating or extenuating
circumstances, the character and military service of the accused, any recommendations
made by subordinate commanders, the interests of justice, military exigencies, and the
effect of the decision on the accused and the command. The goal should be a
disposition that is warranted, appropriate, and fair.
* * * * [listing factors, such as (D) possible improper motives of the accuser and (E)
reluctance of the victim or others to testify.
R.C.M. 306(b).
40

JOSEPH W. BISHOP, JR., JUSTICE UNDER FIRE: A STUDY OF MILITARY LAW 27 (1974). See
also WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 49 (2d ed. 1920).
41

See supra note 25.

42

United States v. Kroop, 34 M.J. 628 (A.F.C.M.R.1992), aff'd, 38 M.J. 470 (C.M.A.
1993).
43

Kroop, 34 M.J. at 632.

44

See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
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enough to warrant trial by court-martial must decide what charges apply. Even with
lawyers drafting the charges, doing so is not easy because the Uniform Code of
Military Justice does not, in terms, prohibit sexual harassment. Although the
Department of Defense (DOD) has defined sexual harassment,45 convening
authorities must choose between a number of potential charges, none of which may
cover conduct that constitutes sexual harassment under the DOD standard. An act of
sexual harassment may constitute “cruelty and maltreatment of a subordinate,”46
extortion,47 indecent language,48 provoking words and gestures,49 disorderly
conduct,50 and/or fraternization.51 If the harassment involves physical contact, it may
45
The Department of Defense definition of sexual harassment, which applies to both
military members and civilian employees, is as follows:
Sexual harassment is a form of sexual discrimination that involves unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature when:
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of a person’s job, pay, or career; or
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by a person is used as a basis for career
or employment decisions affecting that person; or
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual’s work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.
MEMORANDUM, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, TO SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS,
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT, DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE
AGENCIES, SUBJECT: PROHIBITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
(DOD), Aug. 22, 1994, at 1.
46

10 U.S.C. § 893 (2000). This article will often apply to sexual harassment cases, but
cases interpreting this article are ambiguous as to whether it criminalizes maltreatment of
direct subordinates only or extends to any lower-ranking personnel. Compare United States v.
Hullett, 40 M.J. 189 (C.M.A. 1994) (sexually-oriented statements to a junior may violate
Article 93) with United States v. Curry, 28 M.J. 419 (C.M.A. 1989) (remanding because even
though the alleged victim was junior, the appellant had no authority over her). See William T.
Barto, Sexual Harassment and the Uniform Code of Military Justice: A Primer for the
Military Justice Practitioner, ARMY LAW. ARMY LAW, at 4-6 (July 1995). Further, voluntary
acts between the victim and the accused may exonerate the accused. Id., at 7-8.
47
The U.C.M.J. defines extortion as communicating a threat with the intent to obtain
anything of value. 10 U.S.C. § 927 (2000). Sexual favors qualify as something of value.
United States v. Hicks, 24 M.J. 3, 5-6 (C.M.A. 1987).
48

10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000). Indecent language is language that is “grossly offensive to
modesty, decency, or propriety, or shocks moral sensibilities because of its vulgar, filthy, or
disgusting nature, or its tendencies to incite lustful thought.” M.C.M. ¶ 89c.
49

10 U.S.C. § 917 (2000). Provoking words or gestures are those that tend to provoke
breaches of the peace. M.C.M. ¶ 42. c.(1).
50

10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000). Disorderly conduct is conduct of a nature to affect the peace
and quiet of those who may witness it and be disturbed or provoked to resentment, including
conduct that endangers public morals or outrages public decency. M.C.M. ¶ 73 c. (2).
51

10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000). Fraternization comprises the act(s) of a commissioned or
warrant officer fraternizing on terms of military equality with an enlisted person when such
fraternization violated the custom of the accused’s service that officers shall not fraternize
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constitute assault, assault consummated by a battery,52 indecent assault, assault with
the intent to commit rape or sodomy,53 rape,54 or sodomy,55 as well as cruelty and
maltreatment and/or fraternization. In addition, a court-martial could punish an
accused under the so-called “general article” for conduct to the prejudice of good
order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces,56 or as
conducting unbecoming an officer.57 Choosing among all of these potential offenses
is not easy and often results in so-called “stacking” the charges—charging the
accused with all that may apply and letting the court members sort it out. Selecting
the wrong charge or overcharging can certainly result in an improper verdict.58
with enlisted members on terms of military equality. The explanation states that factors the
court-martial should consider to determine whether the contact or association comprises an
offense include whether the conduct has compromised the chain of command, resulted in an
appearance of partiality, or otherwise undermined good order, discipline, authority, or morale.
M.C.M. ¶ 84 c. (1). Fraternization may also be prosecuted as a violation of Article 92, as
violating a general order or regulation if the accused’s service has such a regulation
prohibiting fraternization. 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2000), M.C.M. ¶ 16c.
52

These assaults are both prohibited by 10 U.S.C. § 928 (2000).

53

10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000). Indecent assault is one done with the intent to gratify the lust or
sexual desires of the accused. See ¶ 63, M.C.M. Assault with the intent to commit rape or
sodomy requires a specific intent to commit such crimes.
54
10 U.S.C. § 920 (2000). The maximum punishment for rape is death, confinement for
life, a dishonorable discharge, total forfeitures of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the
lowest enlisted grade. ¶ 46e, M.C.M. Under current military law, the military recognizes that
the necessary “by force and without consent,” ¶ 45b(1), M.C.M., may include “constructive
force,” in which the victim’s consent is induced by the extraordinary power a military superior
has over a subordinate. E.g., United States v. Clark, 35 M.J. 432 (C.M.A. 1992). See
generally, Timothy W. Murphy, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 A.F. L. REV.
19, 26-34 (1996).
55
10 U.S.C. § 925 (2000). Sodomy consists of unnatural carnal copulation, defined as
taking into one’s mouth or anus the sexual organ of another, placing another’s sexual organ in
one’s mouth or anus, or to have carnal copulation in any opening of the body other than the
sexual parts. ¶51c, M.C.M.
56
10 U.S.C. §§ 133-134 (2000) criminalize conduct unbecoming an officer and conduct
prejudicial to good order and discipline or of a nature to bring discredit on the armed forces,
respectively. Article 133 criminalizes “action or behavior in an official capacity which, in
dishonoring or disgracing the person as an officer, severely compromises [his or her
character], or action or behavior in an unofficial or private capacity which, in dishonoring or
disgracing the officer personally, seriously compromises the person’s standing as an officer.”
¶ 59(c).(2)., M.C.M. Article 134 applies to all ranks, and comprises offenses that are specified
in the MANUAL, see supra notes 42, 45, and acts that are only criminal because they are
prejudicial to good order and discipline or service-discrediting. ¶ 60, M.C.M.
57

10 U.S.C. § 934 (2000).

58

See Krohne, supra note 34, at 329. The author concludes:
From these cases one can begin to understand how unpredictably sexual harassment is
handled in the military courts. The wide variety of charges illustrates the
inconsistency of sexual harassment enforcement and punishment. In addition, it is
apparent that a body of consistent case law on sexual harassment has not been
developed in the military courts.
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When a convening authority refers a case to a court-martial, he or she personally
selects the court-members, the military equivalent of civilian jurors.59 Although the
U.C.M.J. provides guidance as to the criteria the convening authority must use to
select court-members,60 as a practical matter the convening authority can get away
with selecting pretty much anyone he or she wants. If, for example, the convening
authority selects all subordinate unit commanders rather than more junior staff types,
he can easily justify it, if challenged by the defense, by saying that commanders are
best qualified by virtue of age and experience to adjudge guilt or innocence and an
appropriate sentence, if the accused is guilty. However, senior commanders would
be more likely to see things in the same way as the convening authority and decide
the case as they believe the convening authority wants them to. Another problem is
the potential appointment of law enforcement officers. Military appellate decisions
often uphold the selection of law enforcement personnel who, presumably, have a
bias toward convicting those they, or their subordinates, have investigated.61
Further, although the U.C.M.J. prohibits reprisals, such as lowered efficiency
reports, against court members for making decisions the convening authority
dislikes,62 court members know that the commander can harm their career without
taking an action severe enough to violate this prohibition, such as “damming [the
court member] with faint praise.” In today’s military, you don’t get promoted unless
you “always exceed requirements,” should be “promoted ahead of contemporaries,”
as opposed to “usually exceed requirements” and “promote with contemporaries.”
Trying to prove that this faint, but career-killing praise is a reprisal for a courtmartial decision is problematical at best. The high-ranking officer who wrote such a
report just has to say that, no, the efficiency report was accurate because the officer
in question always meets requirements and frequently, but does not always exceed
them and thus should be promoted along with all of his or her contemporaries.63
Id.
59
10 U.S.C. § 825 (2000), details who may serve on courts-martial. Any commissioned
officer may serve on a court-martial. § 825(a). Warrant officers may serve on any courtmartial except those trying commissioned officers. § 825(b). If the accused requests enlisted
members, they must comprise at least one-third of the court members and must not be from
the same unit as the accused. § 825(c).
60

Under 10 U.S.C. § 825(d)(2), the convening authority “shall detail as members thereof
such members of the armed forces as, in his opinion, are best qualified for the duty by reason
of age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial temperament.”
61

E.g., United States v. Fulton, 44 M.J. 100 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (proper to deny challenge
against chief of security police); United States v. McDavid, 37 M.J. 861 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993)
(no per se exclusion of security police). Cf. United States v. Berry, 34 M.V. 83 (C.M.A. 1992)
(abuse of discretion to deny challenge against command duty investigator for base security
who worked with key government witnesses).
62

10 U.S.C. § 837, titled “Unlawfully influencing action of court,” prohibits any
convening authority or commanding officer from reprimanding any court member, military
judge, or counsel with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court. Nor may they
evaluate the performance of duty of any court member in any fitness or efficiency report used
to determine promotions, assignments, retention on active duty and the like.
63

See Michael Spak & Jonathan Tomes, Courts-Martial: Time to Play Taps? 28 S.W. U.
L.REV. 481, n.262 and accompanying text.
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Considering the presumption of regularity that the selection of court members
enjoy,64 persuading a military judge to find that the convening authority selected
tough senior commanders to hammer the accused would almost always be doomed to
failure. If, on the other hand, the convening authority selected such members
because they would be unsympathetic to a lower ranking enlisted woman so as to
protect a high-ranking harasser, his or her lawyer, the trial counsel (prosecutor) is
hardly in a position to complain. Thus, the victim’s claim will not result in a
conviction and she will have no effective way to get redress. Double jeopardy
applies in the military as well as in civilian courts.65
Even if the convening authority does not select court members that will reflect
his or her view of good order and discipline, the alternative may be as bad or worse.
Some convening authorities either don’t want their best officers, such as those
selected to be commanders, taking time away from really important things, such as
training for war, and will select court members who are more expendable—and often
less qualified.66
Potential court members that the convening authorities will not select are lowranking enlisted members. Even when an enlisted accused requests enlisted court
members, those court-members will come from the highest enlisted ranks—sergeant
majors, master sergeants, and sergeants first class from the Army, master chief petty
officers and chief petty officers, and similar high-ranking Marine and Air Force
noncommissioned officers.67 These high-ranking enlisted members will share the
same values as the high-ranking officers they work for—and may be even more
conservative and less likely to believe a low-ranking female victim of sexual
harassment by a high-ranking officer or noncommissioned officer.68
Another problem with the convening authority’s control over courts-martial is
that the official decides many pretrial motions. Defense counsel must submit
requests to produce witnesses to the trial counsel (prosecutor) who works for the
convening authority. If the trial counsel does not believe that the law requires their
production, the defense may litigate the matter before the military judge.69 Requests
for expert witnesses, however, must be made directly to the convening authority.
Again refusal may be litigated before the military judge.70 Obviously, the lack of
witnesses harms the truth finding process.

64
E.g., United States v. Giles, 48 M.J. 454, 455-56 (C.A.A.F. 1998); United States v.
White, 36 M.J. 284, 287 (C.M.A. 1993).
65

See R.C.M. 907(b)(2)(C).

66

James Kevin Lovejoy, Abolition of Court Member Sentencing in the Military, 142 MIL.
L. REV. 1, 32 (1993).
67

In the authors’ experience with courts-martial, neither has ever seen a low-ranking
enlisted person detailed to a court-martial as a member of the “jury.”
68

According to the NAVY PERSONNEL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CENTER, ASSESSMENT
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE NAVY: RESULTS OF THE 1989 NAVY-WIDE SURVEY 4 (1992),
females comprised 10% of the active duty personnel of the Navy. Most of these women are in
the lower enlisted ranks. Id.
OF

69

R.C.M. 703(c)(2).

70

R.C.M. 703(d).
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Convening authorities also decide whether to grant immunity to witnesses71 and
whether to enter into plea bargains.72 Because the military may view the victim of
sexual harassment as a suspect, as in a case in which a regulation bans dating
between a trainee and a drill instructor, a refusal to grant immunity to the victim may
result in the greater offender—the one who abused his higher rank and position
going free. And, because of the way convening authorities grant immunity, coupled
with an order to testify, significant potential exists for an alleged victim of
fraternization to either lie or exaggerate the culpability of the higher ranking
servicemember on trial. Although the order to testify is usually couched in terms of
testifying “truthfully,” it is the trial counsel who will decide whether or not the
testimony is truthful. Often the immunity and order to testify are coupled with the
preferral of court-martial charges against the less-culpable, lower ranking female
servicemember and a discharge in lieu of court-martial if she testifies “truthfully”
against the higher ranking defendant. This puts an alleged victim who either
fabricated a sexual harassment complaint or exaggerated it in the unenviable position
of having to testify so as to perpetuate the lie or the exaggeration to avoid trial
herself—again hardly conducive to arriving at the truth.
In a recent trial in which one of the authors was involved, for example, the
alleged victim of fraternization told Army criminal investigators some 50 times that
she did not have sex with the accused, a sergeant at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks
(DB) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. She had admitted to sexual relations with other
DB guards. After being charged with fraternization and other offenses herself, the
convening authority immunized her and ordered her to take a polygraph
examination. The polygraph examiner told her she had flunked, which caused her to
change her story to implicate the accused, relating that she and the accused had
sexual relations on May 16th. The military judge denied a defense request for
production of the polygraph report and charts to determine whether she had, in fact,
shown deception or, as the defense believed, was lied to in order to get her to
implicate the accused. The day before the trial actually started and after the trial
counsel prepared her to testify after receiving notice of the defense alibi for May
16th, she changed her testimony to stating that the sexual encounter occurred the
preceding night, May 15th. She testified at trial that she would lose her discharge in
lieu of court-martial if she did not testify “truthfully” against the accused. Further,
she was ignorant of certain physical aspects of the accused which were so
remarkable that she would have noted if they had actually engaged in sexual
relations. The court members deliberated three hours before acquitting the accused,
who had to face a general court-martial, a dishonorable discharge, and in excess of
71

R.C.M. 704(c).

72

R.C.M. 704. The military pretrial agreement, what civilians would call a “plea bargain,”
differs from civilian practice in that it places a ceiling on the punishment. If the court-martial
imposes a lesser punishment, the accused gets the benefit of that lesser punishment and the
pretrial agreement was nothing more than an insurance policy. If, however, the court-martial
sentences the accused to a more severe punishment, the convening authority must reduce the
sentence to that specified in the plea agreement. See generally, Francis A. Gilligan & Michael
D. Wims, Civilian Justice v. Military Justice: In Many Instances, Service Members Accused of
Crime Are Granted More Rights Than Civilians, 5 SUM. CRIM. JUST. 2, 37 (Summer, 1990).
For a contrary view comparing military and civilian justice, see the authors’ article, supra note
1.
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ten years’ confinement based on such an unreliable witness.73 While this case
involved an innocent accused, it nonetheless demonstrates the unreliability of a
witness who was induced to testify by the convening authority’s powers to enter into
plea bargains and grant immunity—again powers reserved to lawyers in the civilian
system. And failure to exercise such powers could also harm the truth-finding
process and either result in the conviction of an innocent party or the rejection of a
valid claim of sexual harassment.74
The final problem with command control over courts-martial is the problem of
illegal command influence. While much command control is not illegal, such as the
power to select court members,75 convening authorities and other commanders who
go too far in controlling courts-martial may violate Article 37, U.C.M.J., which

73

See Connie Parish, Sergeant Acquitted in USDB Court-Martial, THE LEAVENWORTH
TIMES, March 5, 1999, at 1.
74

The Tenth Circuit’s recent Singleton case, which sent shock waves through federal
prosecutors before the Tenth Circuit on rehearing en banc reversed the decision, illustrates the
unreliability of testimony induced by a promise of leniency. United States v. Singleton, 144
F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev’d, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc), cert. denied, 119
S.Ct. 2371 (1999). In the original opinion, the 10th Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2),
which prohibits unlawful inducements to a witness applied to a U.S. attorney’s promise to file
a motion for a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines if a witness testified
truthfully and not to prosecute him for any other drug offenses against the defendant. Section
201(c)(2) reads:
Whoever . . . directly or indirectly, gives, offers or promises anything of value to any
person, for or because of the testimony under oath or affirmation given or to be given
by such person as a witness upon a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, before any court
. . . authorized by the laws of the United States to hear evidence or take testimony . . .
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
In finding that the statute applied to government agents, the court cited United States v.
Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988)
(“[i]t is difficult to imagine a greater motivation to lie than the inducement of a reduced
sentence . . . .”); United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253, 1255-57 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984) (witness “admitted lying in over thirty different statements
motivated by his sense of self-preservation” under plea arrangement requiring his testimony in
return for a lenient sentence.) In support of the proposition that an obvious purpose of § 201
was to keep testimony free of influence to protect its truthfulness. The en banc opinion,
however, held that § 201(c)(2) did not apply to the United States acting in its sovereign
capacity. That holding would not, however, appear to deny the danger to the fact-finding
process inherent in promising leniency to a defendant in return for “truthful” testimony. And
these dangers may be greater in the military context than in the civilian federal context
because of the command control of the convening authority.
75

See supra nn. 55-60 and accompanying text. The lawful participation of the commander
in the system is one of the dominant features of the military justice system. Teresa K.
Hollingsworth, Unlawful Command Influence, 39 A.F. L. REV. 261 (1996), citing DAVID A.
SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 255 (1992). When,
however, commanders and convening authorities try to influence decisions that should be
independent of command and convening authority prerogatives, it becomes “illegal” or
“unlawful” command influence as prohibited by 10 U.S.C. § 837. Id. Nor is illegal command
influence limited to commanders and convening authorities. Military appellate courts have
applied Article 37 to staff officers, noncommissioned officers, and military judges. Id.
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prohibits illegal command influence.76 Notwithstanding this prohibition, military
officials have continued to attempt to influence courts-martial results improperly.
Among recent such attempts are:
• Issuing policy statements that castigate a certain class of offenders, state that
they should be removed from the military, or discourage witnesses from
testifying for the defense.
• Making speeches that stress the above points to audiences which include
potential witnesses and court-members.
• Publicly humiliating the accused, as by stripping them of unit insignia in a
public military formation, thereby stripping the accused of the presumption
of innocence and biasing potential court members and witnesses.
• Witness tampering, consisting of intimidating witnesses to prevent them
from testifying or punishing those that do.77
While such actions have great potential to prejudice the case, military appellate
courts have developed such a high standard for prevailing on an illegal command
influence claim that the accused seldom gets meaningful, if any, relief.78 Further,
finding evidence of illegal command influence is problematic, at best. Those who
were illegally influenced or witnesses thereto may be reluctant to risk their careers
by informing on their superiors. Further, military defense counsel may not want to
accuse these commanders or others who may sit on the lawyer’s future promotion

76

10 U.S.C. § 837(a) reads:
(a) No authority convening a . . . court-martial, nor any other commanding officer,
may censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or any member, military judge, or
counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or with
respect to any other exercises of its or his functions in the conduct of the proceeding.
No person subject to this chapter may attempt to coerce or, by any unauthorized
means, influence the action of a court-martial . . . or any member thereof, in reaching
the findings or sentence in any case, or the action of any convening, approving, or
reviewing authority with respect to his judicial acts. The foregoing provisions of the
subsection shall not apply with respect to (1) general instructional or informational
courses in military justice if such courses are designed solely for the purpose of
instructing members of a command in the substantive or procedural aspects of courtsmartial, or (2) to statements and instructions given in open court by the military judge,
president of a special court-martial, or counsel.
Section (b) of Article 37 prohibits any person subject to the U.C.M.J. from evaluating the
performance of any member of a court-martial in the preparation of a fitness or similar report
or from giving a less favorable rating to counsel for the accused because of the zeal with
which counsel represented the accused.
77

Deana M.C. Willis, The Road to Hell is Paved With Good Intentions: Finding and
Fixing Unlawful Command Influence, 1992-AUG ARMY LAW. 3, 6-12 (1992).
78
Under the so-called Ayala/Strombaugh test, the defense must first demonstrate that the
alleged source of illegal command influence acted with the mantle of command authority.
United States v. Stombaugh, 40 M.J. 208 (C.M.A. 1994). Ayala places the burden on the
defense to produce sufficient evidence to raise the issue and permits the court to decide that
the evidence of the alleged illegal command influence was not strong enough nor prejudicial
enough to grant relief. United States v. Ayala, 43 M.J. 296 (C.A.A.F. 1995). See Lawrence J.
Morris, This Better Be Good: The Courts Continue to Tighten the Burden in Unlawful
Command Influence Cases, 1998-May ARMY LAW 49 (1988).
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boards, of illegal command influence.79 And, alleging illegal command influence is
not likely to improve one’s chances for a favorable pretrial agreement (plea bargain)
or for clemency if the court-martial imposes a harsh sentence.80
While the requirement to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a court-martial
which can impose criminal sanctions81 is appropriate, this high burden of proof may
result in perpetrators of sexual harassment “getting off,” thus, failing to vindicate
actual victims of such harassment. While only Sergeant Major of the Army Gene
McKinney and the six women he was accused of sexually harassing82 will ever know
what, if anything, really happened, commentators have postulated that the heavy
79

Perhaps the most egregious example of a defense counsel being “punished” for raising
illegal command influence resulted in a Congressional inquiry. An Army lawyer who raised
an illegal command influence issue for one of his appellate clients after his supervising
attorney, a full colonel, told him not to was nonselected for promotion to lieutenant colonel
when his supervisor later sat on the promotion board. The Army Board for Correction of
Military Records found that the colonel should not have sat on the promotion board and
ordered the promotion to lieutenant colonel. As a result of the Congressional inquiry, the
Acting Judge Advocate General of the Army was not confirmed as Judge Advocate General
and retired. A nomination to the grade of brigadier general also failed and the President
withdrew two other nomination for brigadier general. One of these withdrawn nominations
for brigadier general was for the colonel who “punished the defense counsel and later sat on
the counsel’s promotion board. SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, REPORT ON THE
INVESTIGATION OF ISSUES CONCERNING NOMINATIONS FOR GENERAL OFFICER POSITIONS IN THE
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S CORPS, U.S. ARMY, S. Rep. No. 102-1, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1991).
80

Under R.C.M. 705, a convening authority may enter into a plea bargain, known as a
“pretrial agreement,” with the accused. In cases in which the court-martial adjudges a more
severe sentence than that called for in the pretrial agreement, the convening authority must
then reduce the sentence to that called for in the agreement. If the court-martial adjudges a
less severe sentence, then the accused has “beat the deal,” and gets the lesser sentence,
relegating the plea bargain to the status of unused insurance against a more severe sentence.
See generally, Gilligan & Wims, supra note 72 at 37. In any case, whether a pretrial
agreement exists or not, the convening authority may grant clemency by disapproving the
entire sentence or any part thereof. R.C.M. 1107(d) specifies that the convening authority may
for any or no reason disapprove the sentence in whole or in part, mitigate the sentence, or
change a punishment to one of a different nature as long as doing so does not increase the
severity of the punishment. For example, the convening authority could change six months’
confinement to, say, two months restriction, but could not change such a period of restriction
to confinement. In the authors’ experience, the granting of clemency by convening authorities
is very rare. More often, they want to, but cannot, increase the sentence.
81
Under R.C.M. 920(e), the military judge must instruct the court members that “[t]he
accused must be presumed to be innocent until the accused’s guilt is established by legal and
competent evidence beyond reasonable doubt.”
82
SGM McKinney was accused of pressuring female subordinates for sex, forced kissing,
and boasting of his sexual prowess to the six women and one sexual encounter. See Stephen
Komarow, Army Sex Scandal Reaches Higher Service’s Top Enlisted Man Faces Charges,
USA TODAY, May 8, 1997, at 3A; Jane Gross, Former Top Sergeant of Army Is Acquitted of
All Sex Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1998, at A1. The court-martial did, however, convict
him of one obstruction of justice offense for attempting to coach the testimony of one of his
accusers. He was demoted one grade and reprimanded. Jane Gross, Sergeant Major Gets
One-Step Demotion But No Time in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at A1.
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burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt83 or the so-called “good soldier” defense
led to the acquittal. Military Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) is an exception to the
general rule that evidence of a person’s character or a trait, thereof, is inadmissible to
prove that the person acted in conformity with that character or trait on a particular
occasion. Rule 404(a)(1) permits introduction of a “pertinent character trait.84 In the
military, general good military character qualifies as such, as do as other pertinent
character traits.85 The theory is simple—good soldiers don’t commit crimes.86
Because servicemembers receive periodic performance evaluations and often
commendations and decorations for duty performance, adducing evidence of good
military character is seldom difficult.87 In the case of a high-ranking officer or noncommissioned officer, like Sergeant Major McKinney, such evidence can be
overwhelming. To be selected to be the highest-ranking enlisted member of one’s
service, one’s record has to be beyond stellar.
Thus, to convict a high-ranking officer or non-commissioned officer of sexual
harassment, the high-ranking court-members must believe the lower-ranking
complainant, whose credibility cannot be bolstered by evidence of good military
character,88 against the higher-ranking accused, who can adduce evidence of his good
(or overwhelmingly good) military character.89 And unless the lower-ranking

83

Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at A24.

84

M.R.E. 404(a)(1) is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1). See generally,
Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, Note, The Good Soldier Defense and Military Rank at CourtsMartial, 108 YALE L.J. 879 (1999).
85

For example, an accused’s character for truthfulness would be relevant in a prosecution
for making a false official statement. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, LEE D. SCHINASI, DAVID A.
SCHELUETER, MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 366 (1981, 1986).
86
E.g., United States v. Vandelinder, 20 M.J. 41 (C.M.A. 1985)(evidence of good military
character should have been admitted at trial for drug offenses because one with good military
character is less likely to commit offenses which strike at the heart of military discipline and
readiness).
87
Captain Andrea, Expanding the Good Soldier Defense: Use of Character Evidence as a
Defense at Trial, 1993-Dec. ARMY LAW. 30 (1993).
88

Military Rule of Evidence 404(a)(2) only permits evidence of a pertinent trait or
character of the victim of a crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the
same, or evidence of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide or an
assault case to rebut evidence that the victim was the aggressor. The Federal counterpart only
allows such use in homicide cases. F.R.E. 404(a)(2). Under M.R.E. 404(a)(2), the accused
can use this section to attempt to prove that the victim of an assault or homicide has character
traits which tend to prove that the victim may have been responsible for the crime. Good
military character would hardly prove that the victim was responsible for the crime. Under
M.R.E. 608(a) allows an attack on the credibility of a witness or the rehabilitation of the
witness, subject to two limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness and (2) such evidence is only admissible after the character of
the witness for truthfulness has been attacked. Again, general good military character would
not qualify.
89

Aside from the authors’ experience, see Hillman, supra note 84, at 906-09 and n. 144
(citing interviews with practitioners of military law).
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complainant has a lot of corroborating evidence, it is not difficult to guess which one
a court-martial is likely to believe.90
Another possible reason for aberrant decisions by court-martial is the potentially
small size of the jury panel and the two-thirds majority required for conviction.
Unlike federal and state criminal trials, which must have larger juries,91 a military
jury need only consist of five members for a general court-martial and three for a
special court-martial.92 Ballew v. Georgia93 found a five member jury to be
unconstitutional because the quality of justice in group deliberations decreases as the
size of the group decreases and the quality of justice of a jury of fewer than six is
unacceptable. Ballew has not been extended to trials by court-martial, however,94
leaving convening authorities free to detail as few as five members to general court90

See, e.g., J. Lancaster, In Military Harassment Cases, His Word Outranks Hers, Wash.
Post, Nov. 15, 1992, at A1; Editorial, McKinney Case Showcases Military Law’s
Shortcomings, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 1998, at 14A; All Things Considered: Fort Hood
Reactions, (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 16, 1998) (quoting Army officer who stated, “the
outcome of the Gene McKinney case proves what [a female servicemember]’s already known
. . . the more a superior has on his collar, the more he’ll get away with.”). Although officers
and noncommissioned officers do not always wear their rank on their collars, the meaning is
plain.
91

Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (six-person jury is sufficient in all but capital
cases; referring to the federal twelve-member jury as a historical accident, unnecessary to
effect the purposes of the jury system and wholly without significance); Johnson v. Louisiana,
399 U.S. 356 (1972) (nine-to-three vote for conviction upheld); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S.
401 (1972) (ten-to-two vote for conviction upheld). Cf. Burch v. Louisiana, 411 U.S. 130
(1979) (five-of-six verdict unconstitutional, noting that only two states allowed nonunanimous verdicts by six-person juries); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (trial by
five member jury unconstitutional). A general courts-martial may try persons subject to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.), see 10 U.S.C. § 802, for any offense punishable
under the U.C.M.J., see Articles 77-134, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934, and may adjudge
any lawful punishment, including death when authorized by the U.C.M.J. 10 U.S.C. § 818. A
special courts-martial may try persons subject to the U.C.M.J. for noncapital offenses and may
adjudge any punishment not forbidden under the U.C.M.J. except death, dishonorable
discharge, dismissal, confinement for more than six months, forfeiture of pay exceeding twothirds pay per month or forfeiture of pay for more than six months. 10 U.S.C. § 819.
92

10 U.S.C. § 829(b).

93

435 U.S. 223 (1978).

94

In U.S. v. Curtis, 32 M.J. 252 (C.M.A. 1990), the Court of Military Appeals found, in a
capital case, that the capital procedure promulgated by the President was not facially
unconstitutional despite the accused’s assertion that the rule did not prescribe such cases to be
decided by at least 12 members. Cf. U.S. v. Simoy, 46 M.J. 592 (A.F.C.C.A. 1993) in which
Judge Morgan’s concurrence found trial defense counsel’s successful efforts to reduce the size
of the court-martial panel to be deficient, but not so deficient as to warrant relief despite the
following language:
I cannot conceive, therefore, of any single thing appellant’s defense counsel could
have done more damaging to appellant’s chances to escape the death penalty than to
abet the diminution of his court-martial panel. Certainly, this blunder exceeds by an
order of magnitude any errors in choosing not to present more of appellant’s
psychosocial history.
Id. at 627.
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martial. Further, only two-thirds are required to convict.95 If the prosecution does
not convince two-thirds of the court members on the first ballot, the accused is
acquitted.96 Thus, a “hung jury” is not possible on the question of guilt or innocence
in a court-martial. But taken with the small size of the jury, making such a
determination on but one ballot, which may thereby severely cut down discussion,
this voting requirement has great potential for erroneous decisions—especially with
biased court members or an accused with great character evidence.97
Finally, even the U.S. Supreme Court has opined that “courts-martial as an
institution are singularly inept in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional
law”98 and certainly were not designed to protect servicemembers from
discrimination.99 Courts-martial are purely criminal tribunals and are only
empowered to determine guilt or innocence and impose a sentence on a guilty
accused.100 While the military judge may decide whether military law enforcement
authorities coerced a conviction or conducted an illegal search, military judges and
court members have no particular competence in deciding sexual harassment claims,
even if they had jurisdiction to consider anything other than whether the accused is
guilty of some offense under the U.C.M.J. Thus, even if a court-martial believes a
sexual harassment complaintant, and convicts the accused, the victim’s only
compensation will be the knowledge that her complaint was vindicated and her
harasser punished.
95

10 U.S.C. § 852(2).

96

R.C.M. 921(a).

97

In a case in which one of the authors was military defense counsel—the accused, a drill
sergeant, was accused of hitting a trainee—the small court-martial panel acquitted in less than
two minutes after the defense put the accused on the stand to testify that he had hit the trainee.
He further testified that he had been provoked and intimated that the court members would
have done the same thing. The defense also adduced good military character evidence.
Regardless of whether this was the correct result, two minutes did not leave much time for
discussion and deliberation.
98
O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 265 (1969) (holding that off-post offenses must be
“service-connected” for the military to exercise jurisdiction over them), overruled by Solorio
v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
99

O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265.

100

Col. William Winthrop’s explanation of the criminal nature of courts-martial is as true
today as it was in 1920:
[T]he court-martial is strictly a criminal court. It has in fact no civil jurisdiction
whatever; cannot enforce a contract, collect a debt, or award damages in favor of an
individual. . . . Even where it tries and convicts an accused for an offense involved in
an obligation incurred or injury done to another person, . . . it cannot adjudge that the
debt be paid, that the property be returned, or that its pecuniary value or the amount of
the damage, be made good to the party aggrieved. Its judgment is a criminal sentence,
not a civil verdict: its proper function is to award punishment upon the ascertainment
of guilt.
WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 49-50 (2d ed. 1920). For a more
current view, consider William Westmoreland, Military Justice—A Commander's Viewpoint,
10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 5, 8 (1971). “[I]t seems too clear for argument that courts-martial are
criminal courts, possessing penal jurisdiction exclusively and performing a strictly judicial
function in enforcing a penal code and applying highly punitive sanctions.” Id.
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If, as it appears, the court-martial is the wrong system and has the wrong factfinder to determine the validity of sexual harassment complaints and, if it is a decent
system, it cannot award damages, what avenue of redress is preferable?
IV. A FEDERAL (NON-MILITARY) REMEDY FOR MILITARY SEXUAL HARASSMENT
CLAIMS?
A military victim of sexual harassment may not suffer employment related
losses, such as lost wages, because military law would not excuse a harassment
victim who went absent without leave (AWOL) because of the harassment—the
military version of a constructive discharge.101 In United States v. Sutek,102 the NavyMarine Court of Military Review overturned the AWOL conviction of Seaman
Susan Sutek finding that her fear of an impending shipboard initiation which had
elements of sexual harassment was sufficient to excuse her absence because of
duress.103 However, in United States v. Biscoe,104 the Court of Appeals of the Armed
Forces upheld the guilty plea of a female officer who contended on appeal that the
military judge had not made sufficient inquiry into her possible defense of duress
based on sexual harassment. The court focused on her lack of fear of serious bodily
injury—a fear that the Navy-Marine Court had found present in Seaman’s Sutek’s
case. Thus, it appears that a servicemember cannot be “constructively discharged”
from the military because of sexual harassment unless that harassment puts her in
reasonable fear of serious bodily injury.
Of course, many times the military ends up discharging the victim of the
harassment. She may have violated the same regulations against fraternization that
the accused did, although she would clearly be less culpable. Or, the higher ranking
harasser may, upon suspecting that his improper actions may become known, begin
his defense by discrediting the victim—by documenting her poor duty performance
and so on. In a society where arriving to work five minutes late is a criminal
offense,105 any supervisor can easily document “poor” duty performance by
counseling statements, reprimands, poor efficiency reports, as well as by punitive
measures such as nonjudicial punishment and courts-martial. Low-ranking victims
may find themselves facing charges, receiving a grant of immunity and an

101
Spence v. Maryland Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 1147, 1156 (2d Cir. 1993). A constructive
discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes an employee’s working condition so
intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation. Id.
102

United States v. Roberts and Sutek, 14 M.J. 671 (N.M.C.M.R.1982), rev'd. (as to
Roberts), 15 M.J. 106 (C.M.A.1983). As to Seaman Ronald Roberts, the husband of Seaman
Sutek, the Navy-Marine Court of Military Review only approved a sentence of nopunishment. The Court of Military Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision as to Seaman
Roberts, reinstating his adjudged punishment. Id.
103

Paragraph 216g of the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL specifies that an accused is
excused for criminal responsibility under the defense of duress if she had a reasonably
grounded fear of the receipt of serious bodily injury.
104

47 M.J. 398 (C.A.A.F. 1998).

105

M.C.M. & 10e(1). Failing to go to, or going from, one’s appointed place of duty is a
violation of 10 U.S.C. § 836, punishable by confinement for one month and forfeiture of twothirds pay for one month. Id.
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administrative discharge in return for testifying “truthfully” against the accused.106
Because the harassment victims usually want out of the military by this point, they
will accede to this procedure even when it results in a less-than-fully-honorable
discharge and the corresponding loss of military and veteran’s benefits.107 Of course
other victims may continue to serve in the military.
Any military sexual harassment victim, however, may suffer other damages that
sexual harassment law recognizes, such as intentional infliction of emotional
distress, pain and suffering, invasion of privacy, and the like.108 Is there any avenue
of redress for such injuries in the military?
As for administrative remedies within the military, only three exist and none of
them has the power to afford much relief. First, a victim of sexual harassment may
file an Article 138 complaint with her commander.109 If the commander denies
redress, the complaint is forwarded up the chain of command to the officer
exercising general court-martial jurisdiction. The convening authority conducts an
inquiry, grants or denies the relief, and sends a report to the service secretary.110 But,
as discussed above,111 commanders loathe to find sexual harassment in their
commands and short of transferring or disciplining the alleged offender, have little
ability to compensate the victim. An article in the Southern California Review of
Law and Women’s Studies pointed out flaws in using Article 138 to correct sexual
harassment problems:
Although Article 138 does give service people an avenue for redress, it
is not adequate for sexual harassment purposes because . . . it requires the
servicemember to go through the chain of command for relief. Recent
events surrounding the Tailhook scandal and the responses of both the
female service-members who were assaulted and their superiors display
this weakness with the Article. When a Navy Lieutenant helicopter pilot
filed a complaint with her boss, he replied, “That’s what you get for going
to a hotel party with a bunch of drunk aviators.” Another problem with
Article 138 is that it applies only to wrongs committed by a commanding
officer upon a subordinate. The provision will not extend to sexual
harassment between fellow enlisted personnel or to harassment which is
visited upon a commander by a subordinate. Furthermore, depending on

106

See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.

107

JONATHAN P. TOMES, SERVICEMEMBER’S LEGAL GUIDE 40-47 (3d ed. 1996). Less than
fully “honorable” discharges include “general” discharges, which are under honorable
conditions and entitle the recipient thereof to military and veteran’s benefits and “other-thanhonorable” discharges which generally do not result in the receipt of such benefits. Only a
court-martial may adjudge “punitive” discharges—bad conduct and dishonorable discharges
which result in the loss of all benefits. The officer version of a punitive discharge is a
“dismissal.” Id.
108

Lawyers Cooperative Publishing, HANDLING SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASES § 28 (1993).

109

10 U.S.C. § 938.

110

Id.

111

See Chamallas, supra note 14, at 308, and accompanying text; O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at

265.
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which service the victim is in, she may not even have the right to a
military attorney.112
Second, a servicemember can obtain review of his or her discharge from his or
her service’s discharge review board. Such a board can change an unfavorable
discharge to a more favorable one but it cannot revoke the discharge. Nor can it
award damages for improper discharge or anything else.113 Finally, boards of
correction of military or naval records may correct such records to correct an error or
remove an injustice.114 While such a correction could result in the award of back pay
for an improper discharge or reinstatement, these boards cannot award other
damages.115 Further, to get relief, one must have an incorrect record to correct. In
Saal v. Middendorf,116 the court noted that by issuing an honorable discharge, the
Navy “effectively precluded review . . . by the Board for Correction of Naval
Records for there [was] no record left to correct.”117 Nor does the board conduct an
independent investigation118 or have the authority to strike down military policy and
it probably lacks the competence to decide constitutional issues.119 As one
commentator noted:
[The Board of Corrections] is an inadequate means to redress sexual
harassment complaints because it offers no aid unless a victim has a
negative comment on her record as a function of, or in retaliation for,
complaining about sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is rarely
manifested by recorded admonishments. Moreover, “injustice” is not
defined, service-members have no right to a hearing, and complainants
rarely know when they have exhausted intramilitary remedies and earned

112

Murray, supra note 21, at 290-91.

113

10 U.S.C. § 1553. See David S. Franke, Administrative Separation from the Military: A
Due Process Analysis, 1990-OCT ARMY LAW. 11, 19 (1990).
114

10 U.S.C. § 1552.

115

See Von Hoffburg v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1980) (inadequacy of a remedy
available from the Army Board for Correction of Military Records, which lacks authority to
award damages, is outweighed by considerations of efficiency and agency expertise
underlying the exhaustion requirement and by the availability of other remedies such as
reinstatement and payment of backpay).
116
427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev’d on other grounds, Beller v. Middendorf, 632
F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
117

427 F. Supp. at 197.

118

See, e.g., 32 C.F.R. § 723.3(e).

119

See Walmer v. United States Dep’t of Defense, 835 F. Supp. 1307 (D. Kan. 1993), aff’d
52 F.3d 851 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied 516 U.S. 974 (1995) (servicemember pending
discharge for homosexual conduct was not required to appeal her discharge to the Army Board
for Correction of Military Records before asserting the unconstitutionality of the regulations
under which she was discharged in federal court because the ABCMR has no power to strike
down military policy and constitutional issues which are inappropriate for decision by an
administrative body).
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the right to appeal to a civilian court. Furthermore, civilian courts usually
defer to the BCMR’s decisions.120
If, as it appears, the military intra-service remedies cannot afford relief to a
victim of sexual harassment, what about the federal courts? At present, sexual
harassment victims have no greater chance for redress in the federal courts than in
the military system because of the so-called Feres doctrine and because Title VII
does not apply to the military.
Fifty years ago, in Feres v. United States,121 the U.S. Supreme Court held that
servicemembers could not sue the military for monetary damages. Feres involved
lawsuits brought by three active duty servicemembers who were victims of
negligence by military personnel acting within the scope of their employment under
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).122 The Court focused on three rationale for its
decision. First, the FTCA did not create an action by servicemembers against their
military superiors or the government itself because the FTCA created no new causes
of action and because no American cause of action ever allowed a servicemember to
recover damages from their military superiors.123 Second, because the FTCA bases
liability on the law of the state where the act or omission occurred and because
servicemembers have no control over their assignments, it would be nonsensical to
Finally, because
base liability on the law of the state of the forum.124
servicemembers have a generous statutory scheme of military and veteran’s benefits,
Congress must not have intended to give them an additional remedy under the
FTCA.125 Thus, servicemembers cannot maintain a suit if the injury is “incident to
service.”
Notwithstanding almost universal scholarly criticism of the decision,126 the
Supreme Court has continued to affirm Feres. For example, in Chappell v.

120

Murray, supra note 21, at 286-87.

121

340 U.S. 135 (1950).

122

28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680. The FTCA waived sovereign immunity for certain torts
committed by employees of the United States. The relevant portion reads:
[F]or injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
123

Feres, 340 U.S. at 141-42.

124

Id. at 143.

125

Id. at 140.

126

See, e.g., Jonathan P. Tomes, Feres to Chappell to Stanley: Three Strikes and
Servicemembers are Out, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 93 (1990); Barry Bennett, The Feres Doctrine,
Discipline and the Weapons of War, 29 St. Louis U. L.J. 383 (1984); David E. Seidelson, The
Feres Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act: New Insights Into an Old Problem, 11
HOFSTRA L. REV. 629 (1983); Donald N. Zillman, Intramilitary Tort Law: Incidence to Service
Meets Constitutional Tort, 60 N.C.L. REV. 489 (1982); Robert Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine
After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F. L. REV. 24 (1976).
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Wallace,127 the Court extended Feres to constitutional torts committed by the
military, holding that servicemembers could not recover monetary damages for such
wrongs.128 Unites States v. Stanley,129 affirmed Chappell, noting that the courts
should not allow lawsuits that would call into question decision-making:
Even putting aside the risk of erroneous judicial conclusions (which
would becloud military decision-making), the mere process of arriving at
correct conclusions would disrupt the military regime. The “incident to
service” test, by contrast, provides a line that is relatively clear and that
can be discerned with less extensive inquiry into military matters.130
Obviously, many sexual harassment cases could involve extensive inquiry into
military matters. However, the disruption to the “military regime” by allowing such
lawsuits would hardly seem greater than the disruption caused by the Navy’s
investigation into Tailhook, the Sergeant-Major McKinney case, or the Aberdeen
Proving Ground trainee sexual harassment cases.131
127

462 U.S. 296 (1983).

128

Chappell involved claims of racial discrimination. Although the Supreme Court’s
earlier decision in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)
authorized suits for damages against federal officials who had violated the plaintiffs’
constitutional rights, the Chappell Court held that the Bivens limitation on such remedies when
“special factors counseling hesitation” are present, applied to suits by military members
against their superiors, thereby foreclosing relief. Id. at 396. The Court focused on the unique
disciplinary structure of the military and Congress’ activity in the field. 462 U.S. at 304. The
Court did note that injunctive relief or other forms of relief not involving damage awards
remained available. Id.
129

483 U.S. 669 (1987).

130

Id. at 682.

131

At the 1991 Tailhook convention, junior Navy officers assaulted approximately 83
women. As to the effect of the investigation, one commentator noted:
After allegations surfaced of junior Naval officers’ assaults on women at the Tailhook
convention, the Navy’s attempts to police itself revealed a disturbing pattern of
outright sexism and corruption. The executive branch during the Bush Administration
was also angered by the Inspector General’s inability to investigate the allegations
successfully. The Inspector General and the Naval Investigative Service Command
began preliminary investigations more than a month after the incident and concluded
them only seven months later. After more than 1,500 interviews with officers and
civilians who had been present at the convention, “investigators were able to identify
only two suspects because of officers’ refusals to talk about the incidents.” The
Inspector General’s report also revealed that certain commanding officers refused to
order their subordinates to be photographed so that victims would not be able to
identify their assailants. . . .
As the investigation progressed, scandal heaped upon scandal. H. Lawrence Garrett
III, the Secretary of the Navy and the head of the Tailhook investigation, asked the
Pentagon to take over the investigation when reports surfaced that he was present at
the festivities and that fifty-five pages of documents that revealed his presence were
deleted from the official reports. . . . Using lie detectors, undercover agents, and
detailed computer analyses to dismantle the “wall of silence” that hampered earlier
investigations, the Inspector General found that even more women than suspected had
been assaulted and identified 175 naval officers for possible disciplinary action. . . .
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Nor is there any real evidence that barring servicemembers from suing harms
discipline. Feres and its progeny has not stopped servicemembers’ suits. Rather, it
has made it next-to-impossible for them to win. Servicemembers have still brought
uncounted cases against their superiors and the military.132 Nor does Feres and its
progeny factor in the costs of not affording servicemembers a remedy for sexual
harassment and other forms of discrimination.133 Further, everyone other than
servicemembers can sue the military for negligence and constitutional torts
regardless of any alleged harm to the military from such litigation.134 And many of
those suits involve federal civilian employees of the Armed Forces suing for sexual
harassment.135 Nonetheless, Congress would have to legislatively overturn Feres for
servicemembers to be able to maintain sexual harassment actions in the courts.
Murray, supra note 21, at 282-83. Of all these suspects, none were convicted by court-martial
and only fifty were disciplined at all by fines, reprimands, and the like. Id. at 283-84.
In the Aberdeen Proving Ground case, female trainees accused drill sergeants of sexual
harassment.
The investigation into the allegations uncovered out-of-control sexual
misconduct. “A parade of former trainees, all women, . . . testified that drill sergeants and
trainees alike routinely initiated consensual sexual relations, a violation of military law.”
Elaine Sciolino, Rape Witnesses Tell of Base Out of Control, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1997, at
A8. These witnesses testified about the freewheeling, libidinous atmosphere in which sexual
activity between superiors and subordinates was rampant and drill sergeants competed to have
sex with as many trainees as they could. Id. at A12.
How, then, could the disruption caused by federal court litigation of a sexual harassment
complaint be any more disruptive to the “military regime?”
132

See Rhodes, supra note 126, at 42:
[T]here is no evidence that negligence actions by service members over the past
twenty-five years has degraded the military mission.
The modern soldier has also been litigious in other areas. Although this litigation has
not been particularly productive for the plaintiffs, service members have vigorously
asserted their positions in direct court action against high-ranking officials. The
proliferation of this constitutional litigation apparently has not interfered with military
operations.
133

Uncorrected sexual harassment and other forms of discrimination can certainly harm
morale, unit cohesion, and even the ability to fight. Discrimination against black soldiers in
Vietnam resulted in racial violence and impaired combat efficiency. De Nike, The New
“Problem Soldier”—Dissenter in the Ranks, 49 IND. L.J. 685, 687-89 (1974) (asserting that
racial violence was prompted by underlying resentment by blacks of unequal treatment); D.
CORTWRIGHT, SOLDIERS IN REVOLT 41 (1975) (recounting black soldier’s refusal to go into the
field). See also id. at 56, 140, 154-55, 210, 218-19 (recounting disobedience of orders and
threats to readiness inherent in response to discrimination). Author Tomes’s personal
experience as an infantry platoon leader in Vietnam confirms the above points.
134

See Tomes, supra note 126, at 111.

135

E.g., Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (District court improperly
invaded the province of the jury in granting summary judgment for Navy in sexual harassment
action by former employee); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388 (4th Cir. 1999) (Department of
Defense was not vicariously liable for supervisor’s harassment because of functioning
antiharassment policy and prompt and effective action taken against harassing behavior);
Yamaguchi v. U.S. Dept. of Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1997) (employee was entitled
to jury trial and compensatory damages for harassment occurring after effective date of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991); Bailey v. West, 941 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Kan. 1996) (Army employee

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol47/iss3/5

26

1999]

SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE MILITARY

361

In addition to the overall Feres bar, the F.T.C.A. itself bars intentional torts,
whether based on assault or for negligence that resulted in the intentional tort.136
Thus, Congress would have to amend this section involving intentional torts to
permit victims of sexual harassment to obtain relief under the FTCA.
Another barrier to a lawsuit against the military, assuming Congress overturns
Feres, is the so-called Mindes doctrine. Some circuits follow the Mindes v.
Seaman’s137 test to determine whether a military claim is justiciable. First, as a
threshold matter, Mindes held that judicial review of military activities is permissible
under two conditions: (1) if a servicember alleged either that he had been deprived of
a constitutional right or that the service in question had violated its own regulations
and (2) that the servicemember had exhausted all available administrative
intraservice remedies.138 After the servicemember meets that test, Mindes specifies
four factors for a court to review: (1) the nature and strength of the plaintiff’s
challenge to the military determination; (2) the potential injury to the plaintiff if
review is refused; (3) the type and degree of anticipated interference with the
military function; and (4) the extent to which the exercise of military expertise or
discretion is involved.139 Even though the Mindes court intended for these tests to
determine whether to review a case or abstain therefrom, two of the criteria clearly
go to the merits of a case. Thus, the court must evaluate the merits of a case before
deciding whether to hear it—and they may not have enough information early in the
case to do so properly.140 Not all circuits follow Mindes, however, and may
substitute another test to determine whether a military case is justiciable.141
made sufficient allegations to support quid pro quo sexual harassment claim); Skinner v.
Caldera, 1999 WL 1001468 (E.E.O.C) (agency (Army) is liable because it knew of the sexual
harassment and did not take prompt remedial action).
136

28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); Perkins v. United States, 55 F.3d 910 (4th Cir. 1995). The 1974
amendment to the F.T.C.A., however, added some intentional torts committed by law
enforcement officers, such as assault, battery, false imprisonment, and the like to the torts for
which a plaintiff could recover. Act of Mar. 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50, 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h).
137

453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971), appeal after remand, 501 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1974).

138

453 F.2d at 201.

139

Id.

140

Mary C. Griffin, Note, Making the Army Safe for Diversity: A Title VII Remedy for
Discrimination in the Military, 96 YALE L.J. 2082, 2103 (1987).
141
The Seventh Circuit, for example, however, appears to follow Mindes. In Knutson v.
Wisconsin Air National Guard, 995 F.2d 765 (7th 1993), a dismissed Wisconsin Air National
Guard officer brought a civil rights action against the National Guard. In declining to follow
Mindes, the Seventh Circuit noted:
As the Third Circuit has pointed out, the Mindes approach erroneously “intertwines
the concept of justiciability with the standards to be applied to the merits of the case.”
. . . Rather than embracing the Mindes balancing test, we prefer a different approach.
Our inquiry does not involve a balancing of individual and military interests on each
side, but rather a determination of whether the military seeks to achieve legitimate
ends by means designed to accommodate the individual right at stake to an appropriate
degree.
Id. at 768 (citations omitted).
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Hill v. Berkman142 illustrates the problem with the Mindes doctrine and its
variations with regard to Title VII actions against the military. Plaintiff Hill
challenged the Army’s use of the combat exclusion policy contending that it was a
pretext for discrimination against women. The court declined to follow cases
holding that Title VII did not apply to the uniformed military,143 but rather applied a
balancing test similar to the Mindes test to determine whether to review a Title VII
claim against the military. To avoid second-guessing common decisions that are
crucial to disciplinary relationships, courts should not afford a Title VII remedy for
“isolated individual allegations of discrimination,” which are better left to
intramilitary remedies.144 Even those cases involving policies that are applicable to a
large number of servicemembers should not be reviewed unless “the military
decision was clearly arbitrary and erroneous, with a harmful effect present at the
time the dispute reaches the court.”145
Thus, the Hill court used a variant of the Mindes test to vitiate Title VII.
Although Title VII does not permit either individual instances of discrimination nor
discriminatory policies,146 the Hill test only permits hearing military cases involving
the latter. Further, although Title VII does not permit a good faith defense,147 this
decision does, by adopting the clearly arbitrary standard.
Even assuming that a military victim of sexual harassment could bring a lawsuit
for damages, she would find another bar to recovery—the law that protects victims
of civil rights violations. Title VII148 is “the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of
discrimination in federal employment.”149 While one might think that uniformed
military members were federal employees, at least for protection from
discrimination, the overwhelming weight of authority holds that Title VII did not
extend to uniformed military personnel.150 Thus, Congress must not only
legislatively overrule Feres to permit sexual harassment suits against the military, it
142

635 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).

143

See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.

144

635 F. Supp. at 1241.

145

Id. The court believed that such a highly deferential test would allow the military the
necessary flexibility to make and alter policies, id., without explaining why military policies
with a discriminatory impact should be afforded more deference than other organizations.
Griffin, supra note 123, at 2094.
146

See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (individual discriminatory
actions); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (discriminatory institutional policy).
147

Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.

148

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq.

149

Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976).

150

E.g., Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Army, 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Alexander,
572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978). The only case to find sexual discrimination in the military to
be actionable under Title VII is Hill v. Berkman, 635 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (Title
VII could apply in limited circumstances involving facially discriminatory policies).
Berkman, however, was not a sexual harassment case and would only extend jurisdiction to
outrageous incidents of discrimination because investigations into less serious military
decisionmaking would be too intrusive. Id. at 1241.
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must ensure that courts do not use Feres or a variant thereon as a court-made bar to
such lawsuits, and make it clear that uniformed military members are indeed
protected by Title VII.
The recent case of Shiver v. United States151 illustrates the effect of these bars to
sexual harassment lawsuits. The plaintiff was a trainee who was raped by her drill
sergeant at Aberdeen Proving Grounds.152 She sued under the F.T.C.A. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Maryland found against her on all three grounds:
Feres barred her claim, the intentional tort exception of the F.T.C.A. barred her
claims, and federal rights laws prohibiting sexual harassment of federal employees
do not give rise to civil liability in favor of active-duty military personnel.153
Because the court found no jurisdiction, it did not have to decide whether Mindes
made the case non-justiciable.
One commentator has noted that promulgating an Executive Order prohibiting
sexual harassment in the military and setting up a system using administrative law
judges or Inspectors General to investigate and adjudicate claims is unlikely to be
effective because the next President can invalidate the Order and the Inspector
General has demonstrated its inability to handle sexual harassment claims.154 Thus,
151

34 F. Supp. 2d 321 (D. Md. 1999).

152

See supra note 109 for a general discussion of the harassment at Aberdeen Proving
Ground.
153

34 F. Supp. 2d at 322-23. The court could hardly have been more pro-military:
The military services of this country cannot effectively be managed or deployed if
subject to litigative hindsight by federal judges . . . , and, contrary to plaintiff’s
assertion, military discipline would be adversely affected by allowing tort litigation
under the FTCA, as officers’ and non-commissioned officers’ authority and credibility
would both be open to attack outside military authority, thus undermining their
authority. The resulting fear of litigation would paralyze decision-making in the one
section of our society that remains free of such paralysis, and that must remain free of
it, if it is to fulfill its mission. The point needs no more discussion than that.
Id. at 322. One doubts whether the command at Aberdeen, particularly the non-commissioned
officers that committed rape and other sexual harassment had much authority left to
undermine. And, their decision-making appears to have been so aberrant that it needed fear of
something such as litigation. Justice Brennan’s dissent in United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S.
669 (1987), which held that Feres barred the claim of a soldier who was the victim of the
unknowing administration of LSD during military testing, seems equally applicable to sexual
harassment amounting to rape:
The Court holds that the Constitution provides [the plaintiff] with no remedy, solely
because his injuries were performed while he performed his duties in the Nation’s
Armed Forces. If our Constitution required this result, the Court’s decision, though
legally necessary, would expose a tragic flaw in that document. But in reality, the
Court disregards the commands of our Constitution, and bows instead to the purported
requirements of a different master, military discipline, declining to provide Stanley
with a remedy because it finds “special factors counseling hesitation.” This is
abdication, not hesitation.
Id. at 686.
For another horror story in which a federal court found that Feres barred relief, see Stubbs
v. United States, 744 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1984) (lawsuit by an enlisted woman who committed
suicide as a result of sexual harassment would disrupt discipline).
154

Murray, supra note 21, at 288.
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Congress should include uniformed service personnel in Title VII. For this proposal
to work, Congress must also make the military subject to the jurisdiction of the
EEOC.155
This commentator’s proposal is for the Title VII protection for servicemembers
to retain some of the military’s existing grievance procedures while guaranteeing an
impartial review of their complaints in federal civilian courts.156 Such a procedure
would have a number of benefits. First, filing the complaint simultaneously with the
commander and the EEOC counselor as opposed to going straight to the EEOC while
bypassing the command would preserve the commander’s authority and permit early
correction efforts. The EEOC’s initial assessment should, however, result in
preventing or minimizing cover-ups by commanders who do not want their superiors
to think that they have a sexual harassment problem in their unit,157 while protecting
the military from frivolous lawsuits.158 Second, once the victim has exhausted
administrative remedies, a jury can decide sexual harassment cases under a
“preponderance of the evidence” standard.159
What about the potential harm, if any, inherent in permitting servicemembers to
maintain Title VII actions against the military? Commentators have asserted the
following potential harms: disruption of military discipline, inability of the civilian
courts to evaluate military decisionmaking,160 civilian investigators would be
disruptive to the military, and military personnel must have faith in their superiors so
they should not seek recovery from fellow servicemembers and superiors.161
While certain of these concerns have some superficial validity, none of them, nor
the aggregate of them, justify the ban on sexual harassment lawsuits of Feres and
other judicial decisions on the grounds discussed above.162

155

See Gonzalez v. Army, 718 F.2d 926, 928 (9th Cir. 1983).

156

Murray supra note 21, at 299. Murray suggests that servicemembers would first have to
bring simultaneous complaints to their commanding officer and an Equal Employment
Opportunity counselor. They would review the matter with the servicemember and try to
resolve the matter informally. An unsatisfied complainant would then be able to file a formal
complaint with the EEO officer, who would investigate the claim. If the EEO resolution is
unsatisfactory, the servicemember could have an EEOC hearing and bring a civil action. The
extension of Title VII would permit reinstatement, back pay, or other relief. Id. at 299-300.
See 32 C.F.R. § 588.1 et seq. for federal regulations governing the EEOC claims procedure.
157

See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

158

Griffin, supra note 140 at 2106.

159

Professor Chamallas terms the ability of a civilian jury to decide such claims under a
preponderance of the evidence standard a “valuable opportunity,” and notes that civil suits
have the advantage of permitting victims to be vindicated without sending offenders to jail.
Chamallas, supra note 14, at 363.
160
See Robin Rogers, Comment, A Proposal for Combatting Sexual Discrimination in the
Military: Amendment of Title VII, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 165, 193-94 (January, 1990).
161

Douglas R. Kay, Comment, Running a Gauntlet of Sexual Abuse: Sexual Harassment of
Female Naval Personnel in the United States Navy, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 307, 340 (1992).
162

See supra notes 121-53, and accompanying text.
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As to the disruption to discipline, the Feres doctrine, as discussed above, has not
eliminated lawsuits—only recoveries.163 Thus, servicemembers continue to sue the
military and their commanders:
[T]here is no evidence that negligence actions by service members over
the past twenty-five years have degraded the military mission.
The modern soldier has also been litigious in other areas. Although
this litigation has not been particularly productive for the plaintiffs,
service members have vigorously asserted their positions in direct court
actions against high ranking officials.
The proliferation of this
constitutional litigation apparently has not interfered substantially with
military operations.164
Nor does Feres and its progeny prevent lawsuits by servicemembers seeking
relief other than monetary damages nor suits by civilians against the military,
including civilian employees of military departments suing for employment
discrimination including sexual harassment.165 As Justice Scalia noted:
The Court fears that military affairs might be disrupted by factual
inquiries necessitated by Bivens actions. The judiciary is already
involved, however, in cases that implicate military judgment and
decisions, as when a soldier sues for nonservice-connected injury, when a
soldier sues civilian contractors with the Government for serviceconnected injury, and when a civilian is injured and sues a civilian
contractor with the military or a military tortfeasor.166
Further, how could a sexual harassment lawsuit be any more disruptive than the
Tailhook investigation and disciplinary action, the Aberdeen Proving Ground’s
courts-martial, or Sergeant Major McKinney’s trial? For example, the Naval
Investigative Service’s investigation into Tailhook comprised of 1,500 interviews
with Navy and Marine aviators, and the incident certainly caused other harm to good
order and discipline:
The failure to deal adequately with Tailhook has had an enormous
effect on the Navy. In the wake of Tailhook, the Secretary of the Navy
resigned. The Senate Armed Services Committee halted all officer
promotions in the Navy. Many valuable officers have lost their jobs;
many more will probably follow. Morale is at a dangerous low. . . .167
In short, no evidence exists that Title VII or any other lawsuits by
servicemembers against their superiors or the military itself seeking damages
actually harms discipline, assuming arguendo that such harm exists, it is no more
163

See supra notes 121-35, and accompanying text.

164

Robert Rhodes, The Feres Doctrine After Twenty-Five Years, 18 A.F.L. REV. 24, 42
(1976).
165

See supra notes 130-33, and accompanying text

166

483 U.S. 669, 703 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

167

Kay, supra note 161, at 310.
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than exists in cases in which military members sue for other redress, such as
injunctive relief, or that harm which exists when civilian employees sue the military
department that employs them. Nor does any evidence exist that a civilian lawsuit is
any more disruptive than a highly politicized sexual harassment court-martial.
Finally, again assuming some harm from such suits, it pales in comparison to the
disruption caused by the continuing harassment experienced in the military service.
As General Douglas MacArthur noted, servicemember’s morale “will quickly wither
and die if soldiers come to believe themselves the victims of indifference or injustice
on the part of their government, or of ignorance, personal ambition, or ineptitude on
the part of their military leaders.”168 More recently, General Frederick M. Franks,
who commanded the United States and British forces of VII Corps during Desert
Storm in the main ground attack that liberated Kuwait, discussed the necessary
character traits for leaders:
Soldiers need to know that we will be there for them when they need us
during the battle and later.
****
Integrity is one of those principles continually put to the test. . . .
Integrity in command is the province of the commander. Are there litmus
tests. Do we mean what we say? Does say equal do? Do we accept
responsibility for our actions no matter what the consequences, or in these
days, the media pressure, or the instant historical reputation? Where are
our loyalties? Do we return loyalty to our subordinates? . . . Do we share
hardships with our troops? Do they see us and hear from us when the
going really gets tough? Do we square up to the really tough calls? Do we
shine the spotlight of inquiry into any area that is called for no matter the
consequences?169
He concludes that if leaders believe in their subordinates and “establish trust,
mutual respect, and loyalty, there is no limit to what the organization can
accomplish.”170
To the extent that such an action would adversely affect ongoing military
operations, the proposed modification by Congress permitting such lawsuits could
have a section similar to the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act,171 which permits
the court to stay civil proceedings, at any stage thereof, in which a servicemember is
a plaintiff or defendant during his military service, unless it finds that the
servicemember’s ability to prosecute or defend the suit is not materially affected by

168

Griffin, supra note 140, at 2109, quoting Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army, for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1933, quoted in BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR
QUOTATIONS 771 (15th ed. 1982).
169
General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., The Fourth Annual Hugh J. Clausen Leadership
Lecture: Soldiering Today and Tomorrow, 158 MIL. L. REV. 130, 134-35 (Dec. 1998)
(emphasis added).
170

Id. at 136.

171

50 U.S.C. § 501-593.
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reason of his or her military service.172 If the military’s ability to defend itself in a
Title VII action was materially affected by, say, a deployment of the unit involved so
that government witnesses were unavailable, a similar provision could provide for a
stay in such circumstances.
The argument that permitting Title VII suits will involve the judiciary in military
matters that it does not have the competence to evaluate does not hold water. First,
sexual harassment cases hardly involve decisions of whether to use Navy Seals,
Army Green Berets, or Marine Force Recon for a particular mission, or
determinations of which servicemembers should be promoted to the next higher
grade based on their military records. Rather, they involve questions such as
whether a particular situation qualifies as a hostile work environment or whether a
particular assault or other action rises to the level of sexual harassment,173 something
federal courts do regularly. Even if such a case has the additional element of having
to evaluate the effect of the hierarchical ranking structure of the military on the
conduct, both sides can educate federal judges and juries on that matter as experts do
on other complicated subjects in many complicated cases, such as civil and criminal
Medicare fraud cases brought under the anti-kickback statute,174 such as antitrust
actions, such as patent infringement cases, and others in which the trier of fact know
little about the technical aspects of the matter.
Would civilian investigators be disruptive? Possibly, but again, no more so than
the military investigators in cases such as Tailhook. First, military investigators
often wear civilian clothes. The Army’s Criminal Investigation Division, the Naval
Investigative Service, and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations typically
wear civilian clothes when conducting investigations.175 Second, any investigator is

172

Id. at § 521.

173

Section 703 of Title VII defines sexual harassment as: unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when: (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual’s employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as a basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment.
174

The federal health care antikickback statute prohibits transactions intended to induce
patient referrals or to compensate one for making such referrals. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b as
amended by H.R 3101, 105th Cong. 204. These extremely complicated cases may involve
billing experts to testify as to whether a payment is bona fide or a kickback, accounting
experts to testify whether an equipment lease is for fair market value, see generally, Pamela H.
Bucy, The Poor Fit of Traditional Evidentiary Doctrine and Sophisticated Crime: An
Empirical Analysis of Health Care Fraud Prosecutions, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 383, 398-411
(1994), or comprises an illegal kickback, legal experts to explain the nuances of the statute
because, as a specific intent crime, the defendant’s belief that the transaction was legal under
the complicated statutory and regulatory scheme is a defense. See Hanlester Network v.
Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
175

See United States v. Swift, 17, C.M.A. 227, 38 C.M.R. 25 (C.M.A. 1967) (Air Force
Office of Special Investigations agent who participated in an investigation by German Police
did not make rights warnings necessary where the agent was solely an observer, was dressed
in civilian clothes, and was not introduced as a police officer).
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disruptive in a sense, military or civilian. But again, so is sexual harassment.176 And
again, it is hard to imagine anything more disruptive than situations such as Tailhook
or the Aberdeen Proving Ground cases,177 whether they ultimately end up with an
EEOC investigation on top of the criminal one or not.
The argument that permitting such lawsuits will cause military members to lose
faith in their superiors seems to be the most specious of all. Such an argument
presumes that service members do not know when their superiors commit wrongs
such as sexual harassment, do not know when their superiors fail to investigate such
wrongs, do not know when their superiors cover up such wrongs,178 and do not know
or care that victims of such wrongs fail to receive compensation. Or, such an
argument presumes that those servicemembers who do know of such wrongs don’t
care, or that they condone sexual harassment. While a few servicemembers, such as
Tailhook aviators, may not care, nothing could be further from the truth with regard
to servicemembers in general. Servicemembers do know of such wrongs and they do
care. Experiencing or learning of such wrongs and their superior’s failures to correct
those wrongs clearly harms morale.179 Servicemembers take an oath to support and
defend the Constitution, not to support and defend their commanders.180 And the

176

See supra note 165 and accompanying text.

177

See id.

178

General Franks, supra note 169, states that in this information age, servicemembers are
informed. “They notice. They pay attention to not only what they are doing but what goes on
around them. They communicate with fellow soldiers about the mission, training, and the
organization.” Id. at 142.
179
From the earliest times, military experts have stressed the need to treat servicemembers
well. Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese general, opined that a primary responsibility of a general
is to treat soldiers with warmth and beneficence. SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 64 (Samuel B.
Griffith trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1963). The strict military disciplinarian, Baron von
Steuben observed that a commanders first objective should be to “gain the love of his men, by
treating them with every possible kindness and humanity, inquiring into their complaints, and
when well founded, seeing them redressed,” quoted in R. RIVKIN, G.I. RIGHTS AND ARMY
JUSTICE 335 (1970). Subsequent military leadership theory confirms von Steuben. World
War I studies demonstrated that resistance to military authority springs from, among others,
degrading use of military authority. See L. RADINE, THE TAMING OF THE TROOPS: SOCIAL
CONTROLS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY 9-10, 34-38, 78-79, 115-16 (1977). What could be
more degrading than a military superior sexually harassing a subordinate and then not permit
the victim the same recourse as civilians enjoy? General McCaffery, past commander of the
U.S. Southern Command, speaking of preventing war crimes against noncombatants, noted
that “[i]f we treat our own soldiers with dignity under the rule of law, with some sense of
compassion, then our soldiers are much more likely to act in a similar fashion toward the civil
population.” General Barry R. McCaffrey, Role of the Armed Forces in the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights, 149 MIL. L. REV. 229, 237 (1995). Author Jonathan Tomes’s 20
years’ experience in the military as an infantry platoon leader in combat in Vietnam, as a
commander in Europe, as a military prosecutor, defense counsel, and military judge is entirely
consistent with the foregoing.
180

All servicemembers take the following oath:
I, ________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic, that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and that I will obey the orders of the
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Constitution would seem to require equal protection of the laws for victims of sexual
harassment in the military as in the civilian sector. Nor are any alleged harms to the
military inherent in such lawsuits supported and, to the extend that they exist, they
are certainly outweighed by the disruption of the amount and nature of the sexual
harassment that is occurring in today’s military, and by the failure to provide
adequate remedies to redress those wrongs.
V. CONCLUSION
To date, the military, and in particular the military justice system, has been
ineffective in eliminating or at least reducing sexual harassment in the military. Nor
does the military have any effective mechanism for protecting the victims of sexual
harassment and compensating them for the harms they suffer. Whether the courts
are correct or not that Title VII does not apply to the uniformed military, Congress
should permit Title VII sexual harassment actions by servicemembers. Further,
Congress should legislatively overrule Feres and its progeny to permit sexual
harassment lawsuits by military members. Even though the doctrinal underpinings
of Feres and its progeny are wrong at worst or have no evidence backing them up at
best, servicemembers cannot depend on the courts to protect their rights as would
seem to be the federal courts’ function.181 Even assuming the existence of some
adverse impact on the military inherent in permitting Title VII actions for sexual
harassment, that harm cannot possibly be worse than the harm from allowing the
continuation of serious incidents of sexual harassment. Courts-martial have not
eradicated it. Zero tolerance policies have not eradicated it. Public condemnation
has not eradicated it. Large damage awards might. Even if Title VII actions do not
deter sexual harassment, at least its military victims will be compensated and
“women constituting our Armed Forces [will be] treated as honored members of
society whose rights do not turn on the charity of a military commander.”182

President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over me,
according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help me God.
10 U.S.C. § 502 (emphasis added).
181
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Chief Justice Marshall stated,
“[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
protection of its laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is
to afford that protection.” Id. at 163 (emphasis added). See also Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S.
241, 247 (1967) (the Constitution intended the courts to be the branch of government
primarily responsible for enforcing the Bill of Rights).
182
Winters v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 57, 59-60 (Douglas, J., 1968). The entire quote
reads:
[I]t is the function of the courts to make sure . . .that the men and women constituting
our Armed Forces are treated as honored members of society whose rights do not turn
on the charity of a military commander. . . . A member of the Armed Forces is
entitled to equal justice under law not as conceived by the generosity of a commander
but as written in the Constitution and engrossed by Congress in our Public Laws.
Id.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1999

35

